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FRAGMENTATION AND DEMOCRACY IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF PUNISHMENT
Richard A. Bierschbach
ABSTRACT—Scholars have long studied the relationship of structural
constitutional principles like checks and balances to democracy. But the
relationship of such principles to democracy in criminal punishment has
received less attention. This Essay examines that relationship and finds it
fraught with both promise and peril for the project of democratic criminal
justice. On the one hand, by blending a range of inputs into punishment
determinations, the constitutional fragmentation of the punishment power
can enhance different types of influence in an area in which perspective is
of special concern. At the same time, the potentially positive aspects of
fragmentation can backfire, encouraging tunnel vision, replicating power
differentials, and making it easier for more well-resourced voices to drown
out others. Thus, the same structure that generates valuable democratic
benefits for punishment also falls prey and contributes to serious
democratic deficits. But despite its drawbacks, we cannot and should not
abandon the Constitution’s fragmented approach to crime and punishment.
The more promising move is to look for ways to make different loci of
influence and representation more meaningful within our existing
framework, doing more to ensure that multiple voices are heard.
AUTHOR—Dean and Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law
School. Thanks to the Northwestern University Law Review for hosting this
Symposium and to the Symposium and Conference participants for their
helpful comments on an early sketch of this Essay.
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INTRODUCTION
What is the relationship of structural constitutional principles like
checks and balances to democracy in criminal punishment? The usual
answer is straightforward: in punishment, as elsewhere, checks and
balances further democracy by avoiding tyranny and abuse. Beyond that, it
is not much discussed. Most treatments of the relationship of constitutional
law to democracy in punishment focus instead on a particular constitutional
provision or institution, and they often lurch between two poles. At one,
constitutional law ensures a popular voice in punishment. The eighteenthcentury jury embodies this vision with its public trials in the town square.
At the other, constitutional law gives a voice to the “discrete and insular
minorities” who are so often punishment’s targets.1 The Warren Court
embodies this vision with its representation-reinforcing approach to judicial
review.
Such neglect of structure is a mistake. Checks and balances and
similar issues of what I call fragmentation—meaning the way in which the
Constitution divides power between actors and governments—have a richer
and more complicated relationship to democracy in punishment than this
picture suggests in good and bad ways. While scholars of government often
see fragmentation as a bug, when it comes to punishment, it also acts as a
feature. Punishment is notorious for the messy mix of competing values,
purposes, and trade-offs it implicates, to say nothing of its demand for
attention to the details of each case. By affirmatively blending a range of
inputs into punishment determinations, fragmentation can enhance different
1

United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 87–104 (1980).
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types of influence in an area in which perspective is of special concern. At
the same time, however, the potentially positive aspects of fragmentation
can backfire, encouraging tunnel vision, replicating existing power
differentials, and making it easier for more well-resourced voices to drown
out others. In either case, the way in which the Constitution fragments the
power to punish is a vital subject of attention for anyone interested in the
intersection of democracy, criminal justice, and constitutional law.2
This Essay fleshes out these points in five short Parts. Part I discusses
fragmentation in sentencing as a case study from positive law, and Part II
shows how fragmentation creates diverse points of influence and
perspective in punishment. Part III translates those points to criminal
justice writ large. Part IV unpacks some of the downsides of fragmentation,
and Part V offers some suggestions for reforms that might do more to
capture its benefits.
I.

SENTENCING

Let me begin with sentencing. Fragmentation occupies a crucial place
in the modern constitutional law of sentencing, although scholarship has
been slow to appreciate that. Like much criminal procedure scholarship,
sentencing scholarship can be “clausebound.”3 It treats the individual
constitutional rights that govern sentencing as discrete and isolated
provisions and minimizes the ways in which rights and structural
considerations interact.
Those interactions have become more important as sentencing has
become more imbalanced. The dominance of plea bargaining, the
disappearance of jury trials, the decline of parole and executive clemency,
the growth of mandatory minima, the rise of sentencing guidelines that tie
judges’ hands—these and other developments have shifted more power to
prosecutors and have squeezed diverse views out of the system. As these
structural imbalances have worsened, the Supreme Court’s constitutional
sentencing law has pushed back against them. To the extent the Court has
intervened in sentencing over the last four decades, it frequently has done
so in ways that have resisted (albeit not prevented) the march toward
concentrated sentencing power. Take three illustrations from three distinct
areas, each of which involves fragmentation in its own way.
2

Here a caveat bears emphasis. As the different dimensions of democracy inherent in the jury and
Warren Court visions suggest, “democracy” and “democratic values” are deep and contested concepts.
My points in this Essay do not turn on any specific definition of them; I simply use them and similar
terms to capture values like representativeness and equal citizenship that are central to virtually all
contemporary liberal democratic theories.
3
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 125 (1998).
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A.

The Law of Apprendi

Apprendi v. New Jersey resurrected juries as a check on the sentencing
power of legislators, prosecutors, and judges under the Sixth Amendment.4
Given the prevalence of plea bargaining, Apprendi was something of a
hollow victory for the jury, and in some ways it might even have
strengthened prosecutors’ hands. But later decisions gave its underlying
structural concerns real bite. They further spread out power among
sentencers by invalidating binding guidelines, freeing sentencing judges to
consider a wide range of factors and policy concerns through reasoned
variances at sentencing, and fine-tuning appellate review to prompt more
give-and-take among sentencing judges, appellate courts, and sentencing
commissions.5 Critics complain that those decisions have little to do with
the Sixth Amendment’s aim of reinjecting the jury into punishment. That is
true and misses the point: on this reading, the Apprendi line is less about
furthering the individual jury right than it is about catalyzing the systemic
diffusion of concentrated power. The Sixth Amendment is the tool, not the
goal.
B.

Juvenile Sentencing

Miller v. Alabama and Graham v. Florida7 struck down mandatory
life-without-parole sentences for juveniles convicted of homicide offenses
and discretionary life-without-parole sentences for juveniles convicted of
nonhomicide offenses, respectively. Most commentators follow the Court’s
lead in analyzing these decisions mainly as matters of substantive
proportionality. But they also embody fundamental points about the
institutional and procedural structure of juvenile sentencing. Both
decisions, after all, left fully intact the power to imprison juveniles for their
natural lives. Their more significant effect was to shift the decisional power
to do so, from legislatures to trial judges and prosecutors in Miller and
from trial judges and prosecutors to parole boards in Graham. Despite its
doctrinal use of proportionality, those systemic consequences were not lost
6

4

530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires any fact other than the fact
of a prior conviction that increases a sentence beyond the statutory maximum to be presented to a jury
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt).
5
See, e.g., Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 500–05 (2011); Kimbrough v. United States,
552 U.S. 85, 111 (2007); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 354–55 (2007); United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220, 259–65 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304–05 (2004).
6
567 U.S. 460 (2012).
7
560 U.S. 48 (2010).
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on the Court. Both opinions weave into their analyses passages recognizing
that the structure of juvenile justice is unbalanced.8
C.

Capital Punishment

Constitutional capital sentencing law substantially breaks apart the
power to impose the death penalty. The Supreme Court takes the death
penalty off the table for certain crimes and offenders. Legislatures then
make broad, ex ante judgments that lay out criteria for death-eligible
crimes. Prosecutors make first-cut, ex post judgments about whether to file
capital charges. Juries assess that judgment twice, at both the guilt and
sentencing stages. Judges independently review potential death sentences at
charging, immediately after trial, and on automatic appeal. Even governors
pay more attention to clemency as a safety valve in capital cases than in
noncapital cases. While the Court has not strictly required each of these
procedures under the Eighth Amendment, it has viewed most of them as
critical to capital punishment’s constitutionality.9 The upshot is that, as
Douglas Berman notes, “whatever one’s perspective . . . on the modern
administration of capital punishment, the system at least has the benefit of
subjecting prosecutors’ sentencing judgments . . . to a series of meaningful
‘second looks.’”10
Several observations jump out about these cases. First, with the
exception of limited portions of some of the Apprendi decisions that
discussed the jury as a check, none is self-consciously about fragmentation.
Second, their interventions have not been theoretically or doctrinally pure.
They have moved in fits and starts, and they rest on a grab bag of
interpretive approaches and constitutional grounds—formalism and
functionalism, the Sixth Amendment and the Eighth. Third, in part for
those reasons, scholars do not normally view them together, instead
lumping distinct lines of cases into their own doctrinal boxes. Finally,
despite all that, the basic idea of fragmentation inhabits their interstices.

8

See Miller, 567 U.S. at 488–89 (discussing the “limited utility” of juvenile transfer decisions as a
check on the excessive punishment of juveniles); Graham, 560 U.S. at 67 (observing, based on
structural considerations, that “the fact that transfer and direct charging laws make life without parole
possible for some juvenile[s] . . . does not justify a judgment that many States intended to subject
[them] to [such] sentences”); Richard A. Bierschbach, Proportionality and Parole, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
1745, 1780–81 (2012).
9
See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of
Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 371–96 (1995) (reviewing
the constitutional framework for regulation of capital punishment).
10
Douglas Berman, Keynote Address, Encouraging (and Even Requiring) Prosecutors to Be
Second-Look Sentencers, 19 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 429, 432 (2010).
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Together they evince a shared (if imperfectly realized) theme: in
sentencing, as elsewhere, no single actor should hold all the cards.
II.

PUNISHMENT

That theme has special purchase when it comes to punishment. In that
context, fragmentation is not only a check against the government. In an
ideal world, it also acts as an affirmative good, working to ensure that
punishment not only reflects the eighteenth century’s populism or the
Warren Court’s representation-reinforcing countermajoritarianism, but also
filters a broader range of views and considerations that matter to
stakeholders on criminal justice issues. That is especially appropriate
because of the indeterminate and perspective-driven nature of punishment
determinations.
Substantively, punishment implicates a wide and messy array of
competing values and objectives. Great disagreement often exists about
how to weigh and apply the purposes of punishment—deterrence,
retribution, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—generally and in specific
cases. Even where some common ground exists, punishment must account
for and pursue things like mercy, equality, fairness, reform, consistency
across cases, healing, and dignity, among other weighty goals and values. It
must protect the public while respecting individual defendants and victims.
And it must simultaneously embrace rules and standards and be forwardand backward-looking, as what looks just ex ante in the abstract might look
unjust ex post in a real, flesh-and-blood case.11
For these reasons, as Henry Hart put it, punishment demands
“multivalued rather than . . . single-valued thinking.”12 That is why the
Supreme Court has steadfastly resisted commitment to any single purpose
of punishment as a matter of constitutional law.13 Comparative desert,
informed by evidence of community consensus, provides a backstop for a
small number of especially severe sentences, mostly capital ones. But
beyond that, the Constitution leaves room to effectuate a “constantly
shifting adjustment of the tension between the evolving aims of the
criminal law and changing religious, moral, philosophical, and medical
views of the nature of man.”14
11

See Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Constitutionally Tailoring Punishment,
112 MICH. L. REV. 397, 428–29 (2013).
12
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 401
(1958).
13
See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,
999–1000 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
14
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536 (1968) (plurality opinion).
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Procedurally, that adjustment process involves a host of actors, each
with its own strengths and perspectives on the demands of justice. Some
are well suited to bringing ex ante, high-level, and more centralized
viewpoints to bear. Legislatures (at least in theory) are good at ranking
categories of crime and making decisions about basic trade-offs.
Sentencing commissions can do much of the same and can gather and
crunch data, generate information on the costs of sentencing options, and
establish more detailed guidance for given crimes and sentences. Appellate
courts can spot trends and differences in treatment of similar types of cases
that might be lost on frontline sentencers and can further craft rules and
doctrines to guide line-level players.
Other actors are better at weighing individualized, granular, and ex
post considerations. Juries and (when they have discretion) sentencing
judges are especially good at considering particularistic, human aspects of
blameworthiness. So too are prosecutors, who apply their equitable
judgment in deciding which cases to charge, which to drop or divert, and
what plea deals to strike. Probation and parole officials can evaluate
offenders’ prospects of and progress toward rehabilitation and reform. And
governors exercising their clemency and pardon powers can do the same
and can factor in other case-specific and circumstantial concerns that other
actors failed or were unable to consider.
Each of these actors represents stakeholders in different ways.
Legislatures are broadly representative and aggregate the abstract and
general preferences of the body politic as a whole. Governors do so too, but
from a unitary and often more ex post standpoint. Juries are at the opposite
end of the spectrum: they directly inject the views and lay intuitions of
ordinary, local citizens into real cases. Elected prosecutors are somewhere
in between, channeling local community concerns about crime and justice.
Judges likewise hear and filter local concerns, including those of
defendants, victims, family members, and local community members. They
also police punishment for deeper democratic failures by enforcing
individual constitutional rights. Most state sentencing commissions include
voices from across criminal justice, such as defense lawyers, prosecutors,
judges, corrections officials, legislators, and members of the public.15
Parole boards consider the views of the community, victim, and victim’s
and offender’s friends and family when making their decisions. And
probation and parole officers work closely with communities to help exoffenders get their lives back on track.

15

Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Still Going Strong, 78 JUDICATURE 173, 174
(1995).
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All of this explains why the Constitution does not prescribe particular
goals of punishment or, except in rare circumstances, interfere with
particular sentencing outcomes. In our system, just punishment is not, and
has never been, a matter of a priori philosophical principles. It is a matter
of democratic processes, of dialogue and deliberation that engages all of
the considerations that plausibly inform punishment—not only its
multiplicity of values, but also the different viewpoints, practical needs,
and interests of stakeholders.16 The Constitution embodies that notion in a
concrete set of institutional arrangements designed to give content to
punishment by filtering those variegated inputs through different actors.
Just punishment, by and large, is what comes out of that process; it is
defined by the process that produces it.
This also explains why the fact that fragmented sentencing might lead
to different sentences across different decisionmakers for similar offenders
is not, without more, an affront to its constitutionality. Norms of equality
are fundamental to any democratic system of punishment, and the
dispersion of outcomes flowing from fragmented and decentralized
sentencing is a frequent topic of concern. But when it comes to
punishment, part of the point of fragmentation, especially insofar as its
localist and community dimensions are concerned, is that different
stakeholders might weigh the competing goals and values of punishment
differently.17 So long as they do so through a process that takes care to
ensure that discrete and powerless groups do not bear a disproportionate
risk of worse results—so long as, in other words, the process is not infected
by any democratic failures and does not rest on any constitutionally
impermissible considerations—the Constitution lets divergent punishments
fall where they may. As the Court’s jury cases emphasize, that respect for
normative variation between and among communities is essential to
punishment’s legitimacy.18
III.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE

In these ways, the Constitution’s approach to sentencing is
microcosmic of its approach to criminal justice. Fragmentation of criminal
justice is baked into our constitutional framework, in the basic division of
16

Variants of this theme appear repeatedly in the Court’s sentencing cases. See, e.g., Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67–68 (2010); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350 (2007); Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 326 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1,
4–5 (1986).
17
See Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, What’s Wrong with Sentencing Equality?,
102 VA. L. REV. 1447, 1461–64 (2016).
18
See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 618 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment);
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968).
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power in Articles I, II, and III and in numerous textual provisions. Article
I’s Ex Post Facto, Bill of Attainder, and Habeas Corpus Clauses prevent the
legislature from exercising the judicial power by retrospectively targeting
individuals for punishment or detention.19 Article II’s pardon power gives
the executive a hand in punishment, and Article III ensures (through its life
tenure and salary provisions) that judges can enforce constitutional limits
through impartial process and, through its guarantee of a jury trial for all
crimes, that the citizenry can check all three branches.20 The Bill of Rights
layers on yet more mechanisms for fragmented input, including grand
juries, public scrutiny of trials, the drawing of jurors from the local
community, and a reasonableness limitation on searches and seizures—a
limit that, Akhil Amar and others have argued, incorporated the views of
local juries as originally applied.21 The Tenth Amendment (and federalism
generally) makes clear that states, localities, and “the people” have central
roles to play as well.22
The diffusing effects of this structure radiate into nearly every
doctrinal area. To take the Fourth Amendment as an example, local
executive officials—elected mayors, elected or appointed police chiefs, and
line-level police officers—build their compliance and implementation
efforts around local needs and priorities, which might vary based on crime
rates, community preferences, or policing philosophy. Disaggregated local
judges give content to and enforce the Amendment’s protections in
suppression hearings, and local juries periodically weigh in also. We
typically think of Katz v. United States’ famous “reasonable expectation of
privacy” test as laying down national norms for protected conduct.23 But as
applied in local courts, it often incorporates and turns on local norms about
privacy and seclusion as well as duly enacted state and local laws and
judge-made common law defining property or the like.24 Appellate courts
review and shape those interpretations and applications, and legislative
bodies sometimes respond to them by expanding or restricting privacy
protections in selective areas. And state and local legislative bodies initially
delimit the conduct that might trigger Fourth Amendment searches and
seizures by defining the bounds of criminal conduct through state laws and
municipal codes. As with sentencing, what determines a lawful search and
19

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cls. 2–3; id. § 10, cl. 1.
Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. III, § 1; see Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the
Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1013–16 (2006).
21
U.S. CONST. amends. IV–VI; AMAR, supra note 3, at 70–77, 85–89, 105–06, 112–13.
22
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
23
389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
24
See William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment,
129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1834–36, 1867–71 (2016).
20
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seizure is the product of many institutions and actors, each with its own
perspective and each representing stakeholders in its own way.
The same dynamic flows through criminal justice writ large. As a
matter of constitutional norms and practices, if not doctrine, criminal
justice is highly disaggregated. Most criminal justice matters remain
matters of state and local law. State attorneys general and police might
investigate and prosecute some subset of especially significant crimes (like
large-scale frauds or terrorism). But they leave the vast bulk of
enforcement to localities, which pass and enforce their own codes in
addition. That enforcement apparatus includes thousands of counties and
municipalities, several thousand prosecutors’ offices employing tens of
thousands of prosecutors, and more than twelve thousand police
departments employing hundreds of thousands of officers. It also includes
thousands of local courts, judges, jails and prisons, parole and probation
officers, and everyday citizens who interact (as jurors or otherwise) with
the system on a daily basis.25
The benefits of this structure are not only—or even primarily—in
guarding against governmental abuse. They also rest on broadly democratic
concepts like representativeness, deliberation, and self-determination. As
with sentencing, fragmentation provides multiple nodes of input that allow
communities and neighborhoods to tailor on-the-ground criminal justice to
their unique needs and reconcile competing values and priorities in their
own ways—to, in short, give content and meaning to the messy,
multivalued, and trade-off-laden enterprise that is criminal justice. That is
why it is not uncommon to see different local prosecutors, police
departments, and courts and judges taking different enforcement or
sentencing approaches to the same state- or even citywide laws. It is also
why many movements that self-consciously seek to make criminal justice
more responsive to stakeholders—like problem-solving courts, community
policing and prosecution, and community justice centers—are

25

See SUZANNE M. STRONG ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
CENSUS OF PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS, 2012, at 1, 3–4 tbl.1 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/cpsc12.pdf [https://perma.cc/TWY5-YHW5]; DUREN BANKS ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL SOURCES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYMENT DATA
1 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/nsleed.pdf [https://perma.cc/N29W-4FDP]; BRIAN A.
REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2013:
PERSONNEL, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 1 (2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd13ppp.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4TTH-GDVW]; STEVEN W. PERRY & DUREN BANKS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2007 – STATISTICAL TABLES 1
(2011), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/psc07st.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8JT-TCHV].
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overwhelmingly seen as taking necessarily decentralized, bottom-up
approaches to crime and punishment.26
To be sure, the precise ways in which fragmentation will facilitate
democracy in criminal justice will vary based on one’s theory of
democracy—whether it be pluralist, participatory, deliberative, antiinegalitarian, or something else.27 But robust avenues for input and
exchange are central to virtually every one of these theories.28 And
fragmentation helps—at least ideally—to provide them.
IV.

LIMITS

That is the optimist’s vision. But of course, fragmentation has its
democratic limits and downsides. Most glaring, the mix of inputs that the
Constitution assumes will inform punishment in theory often fails to do so
in fact.
This happens for a variety of reasons. One problem is politics. In
almost every institutional arena, the politics of criminal justice is
notoriously “pathological.”29 Legislative and gubernatorial elections, even
prosecutorial elections, are blunt instruments for highlighting nuanced
policy differences and eliciting granular input from voters on specific
policies. Election rhetoric often turns on high-profile, sensationalist, and
atypical cases or crimes. While the benefits of appearing smart on crime are
increasing, the risks of appearing soft on crime are still very substantial.
Many of the groups most affected by real-world punishment policies—such
as poor, urban, inner-city communities—have little voice at the ballot box
and no real lobbying presence, leaving them with no effective say in
criminal justice policymaking. (Felon disenfranchisement laws mean that
most prisoners and ex-prisoners literally have no electoral voice.) Wellorganized, well-funded, and usually tough-on-crime special interests—
victims’ groups, prison workers, police unions, the National Rifle
Association—overwhelm debate and exert a disproportionate influence
instead.
Perspectives thus flatten out, with legislators, prosecutors, governors,
and elected judges often hearing roughly the same thing, and more of it. A
26

By contrast, some of the worst excesses of criminal justice in recent years—namely, those of
federal sentencing—occurred in an institutional context in which stakeholder participation and on-theground experimentation were minimal.
27
David Sklansky has elegantly dissected such differences in the context of policing. See generally
David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699 (2005).
28
See Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sentencing, 97 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 20–24 (2012).
29
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 505
(2001).
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similar problem exists at the retail level, where the voices of powerful
defendants and their communities—think of corporate and white-collar
cases—carry disproportionate weight at every point of the process, and the
voices of marginalized defendants and their communities often get little
traction.
Fragmentation also mutes the manifold influences that different actors
ideally filter and represent. Prosecutors, for instance, ideally carefully
consider the merits and context of each case and the needs and
circumstances of the community, victim, and offender before deciding how
to charge or what sentence to recommend. In reality, though, they often see
their job as clearing the cases in front of them, giving them professional
incentives to stack up convictions, boost clearance rates, and layer on plea
bargaining chips by overcharging. They have few incentives to consider the
impact of their recommended sentences on the community or even the
direct costs of those sentences for taxpayers, as prison and jail costs come
out of other actors’ budgets. Parole boards ideally channel community
concerns about safety and the virtues of forgiveness, moral reform, and
rehabilitation. In reality, risk aversion almost always trumps everything
else, as parole boards never capture the benefits of correct release decisions
but stand to suffer immediate reprimands for incorrect ones. Sentencing
judges trying to balance the interests of the victim, defendant, and
community in punishment might lack information about how exactly a
sentence of community supervision will be applied or what it will cost, and
they have no direct incentive to consider cost in any case. Similar
distortions affect other actors. Diffusion of power, in short, has a blinder
effect: it both encourages actors to focus only on their narrow job, and
makes it harder to take account of broader interests even if they want to.30
A lack of accountability mechanisms exacerbates these problems. It is
easier for actors to ignore broader interests if they do not need to explain or
justify their decisions—which, with the partial exception of sentencing
explanations, most actors in the punishment pipeline do not. It is also easier
for them to ignore (or uncritically agree with) each other, undercutting the
dialogic benefits of fragmentation that much of constitutional sentencing
law presupposes.31 By providing multiple points of influence,
30

See Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Rationing Criminal Justice, 116 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming
2017)
(manuscript
at
13–18),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2924584 [https://perma.cc/B4XC-4QUY].
31
Many observers of federal sentencing law, for instance, complain that the rule allowing federal
appellate courts to presume that district courts’ within-Guidelines sentences are reasonable encourages
district courts uncritically to follow the Guidelines and impedes the conversational development of
sentencing law that United States v. Booker envisioned. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Booker in the
Circuits: Backlash or Balancing Act?, 6 HOUS. L. REV.: OFF THE RECORD 23, 29 (2015).
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fragmentation might even impede accountability and undermine expansive
representation of interests. Savvy or wealthy players can find and exploit
the access points that work best for them, such as when prison guard unions
lobby for tougher sanctions or when corporate executives marshal teams of
lawyers to work with prosecutors and regulators on deferred prosecution
agreements that spare them any serious sanction. Dispersed or less visible
ones might not have the experience or wherewithal to do so, and might find
it more difficult to demand an accounting of multiple actors than a single
one for policies and decisions that ignore their views.
Again, these points generalize. Return to the Fourth Amendment.
While the perspectives of multiple actors might inform and give content to
Fourth Amendment law, those perspectives often favor the powerful. The
Amendment’s incorporation of local laws and customs into reasonable
expectations of privacy tilts it toward the propertied and moneyed classes
who can buy privacy through land or the legislative process, as William
Stuntz has shown.32 Tailoring implementation around dominant local needs
and priorities can translate to interventions like order-maintenance policing
that, while sensible to some local community members, are viewed more
suspiciously by the residents of the neighborhoods at which they are aimed.
Fourth Amendment reasonableness is judged from the standpoint of a
police officer interacting with a potential perpetrator or a hypothetical
innocent person. It does not factor in the lived experiences of real fleshand-blood targets, often politically disempowered minorities, whose
responses to police conduct are colored by a long history of police abuse.33
And while the Fourth Amendment’s balancing test of public need versus
individual right considers the interests of the defendant immediately before
the court, it does not consider the interests of defendants as a class, let
alone the interests of clearly innocent (but still searched) individuals as a
class, whose cases do not even wend their way into the pipeline.34 The
Amendment’s transactional focus thus systematically fails to take into
account the perspectives of, say, inner-city minority youths, who might
experience a large-scale stop-and-frisk initiative (like New York City’s) as
a program to police them as a group, or everyday telephone users, who
might chafe at learning that the National Security Agency is collecting and
32

William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1265, 1265–67 (1999).
33
See Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 969–70
(2002).
34
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1968) (discussing the Fourth Amendment’s balancing test);
Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 534–35 (1967); Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as
Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039, 1051–56 (2016) (observing that Fourth
Amendment balancing considers only the interests of the individual being searched).
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searching metadata from their calls (as it did under the USA PATRIOT
Act). But while the telephone users might be able to press their concerns
effectively in the political process, the inner-city youths cannot.
As in sentencing, the fragmentation of power can encourage tunnel
vision. Police, for instance, have little incentive to consider what their
arrest decisions will do to prosecutors’ caseloads, prosecutors have little
incentive to consider what their bail recommendations will do to local jail
populations, and neither have much incentive to consider how their actions
will affect the defendant’s job, family members, or neighborhood, let alone
the public fisc. Part of the problem is doctrinal: those wider considerations
are not baked into the constitutional or statutory criteria governing arrest or
bail. But a big part of it is a psychological consequence of fragmentation:
when the administration of criminal justice is split up between many
players, each with her own bailiwick, focus naturally narrows. Even where
actors could think and act more broadly, the siloed decisionmaking of
fragmentation might become an excuse, allowing them to disclaim a
particular injustice or pathology as not their fault.
The same accountability and related concerns discussed above follow.
Who is accountable when no one actor in the criminal justice pipeline
clearly has the responsibility to consider and give effect to a range of
interests and points of view, let alone explain why she is doing so?35 Wellorganized and well-resourced groups can use this structure to their
advantage, but the loosely organized and poorly resourced groups who so
often are in the trenches of criminal justice cannot. For them, it is a barrier,
not a boon.36
V.

REFORMS

We are left with a dilemma: the same structure that potentially
generates valuable democratic benefits for punishment in terms of voice
and perspective also falls prey and even contributes to serious democratic
deficits. What to do?
Answering that question would be difficult in a lifetime’s work, and I
certainly cannot do it in a few paragraphs. But despite its drawbacks, we
cannot and should not abandon the Constitution’s fragmented approach to
35

Contrast this with the unitary structure of agency regulatory authority in many areas of
administrative law, in which all interests and points of view filter through a single, centralized agency
that makes substantive rules and controls retail enforcement and sanctioning, and must rigorously
explain and defend its decisions.
36
For two excellent treatments of this effect, one dealing with policing and one dealing with
criminal justice policymaking, see LISA L. MILLER, THE PERILS OF FEDERALISM: RACE, POVERTY, AND
THE POLITICS OF CRIME CONTROL (2008), and Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real
Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870 (2015).
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crime and punishment. We cannot easily centralize everything at the
federal or state level, nor can we easily eliminate the separate spheres of
authority that actors in the system inhabit (though legislatures sometimes
try). Even if we could, such changes would lead to more worrisome
problems, such as criminal justice cut off from local conditions and even
more beholden to powerful interests than it is now. The more promising
move is to look for ways to make different loci of influence and
representation more meaningful within our existing framework—to do
more to ensure that multiple voices are heard.
Constitutional law can help, to a degree. Like the Warren Court,
courts interpreting individual rights provisions could do more to reinforce
perspectives that are often excluded from the process. For a sampling of
possibilities, courts applying the Fourth Amendment could fold the
outlooks of victims of police abuse, innocent civilians, and communities of
color into their reasonableness analysis. They could look beyond the
interests of individual defendants to accept aggregate data as evidence of
the existence or gravity of group-based targeting and other harms from
repeated searches, as Judge Shira Scheindlin did in the high-profile
challenge to New York City’s stop-and-frisk program.37 The law of Batson
v. Kentucky could be liberalized to make it easier to challenge juries that
have been skewed along racial or gender lines, making them more
representative of the community.38 Juries could be allowed to know the
penal consequences of their verdicts (which, outside of jury sentencing,
current law ordinarily prohibits), expanding the factors they consider in
their deliberations. More generally, the Equal Protection Clause could be
given real teeth as a tool of judicial oversight with respect to police
conduct, prosecutorial charging, and sentencing. Collateral consequences
that impair voice, like felon disenfranchisement and prohibitions from
serving on juries, could be held to more rigorous constitutional standards
and struck down unless they directly relate to the crime of conviction.
Constitutional law also could force actors to listen more and take
accountability seriously. Graham’s requirement that parole boards give
juvenile offenders a “meaningful” opportunity for release could itself be
made meaningful by requiring parole boards to robustly explain and justify
their decisions;39 that would better force them to confront the defendant’s,
37

Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
474 U.S. 79 (1986); see Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury
Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed
Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 161–65 (2010) (discussing the difficulty of proving
unconstitutional reliance on race or gender in jury selection under Batson).
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Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010).
38
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victim’s, and community’s interests and to grapple with the forwardlooking considerations that in theory they should take into account. One
might even apply some similar, if more deferential, reason-giving
requirement to prosecutorial charging and bargaining decisions in some
subset of serious cases as a matter of due process, which could serve to
enhance feedback and responsiveness from and to the community.
Constitutional doctrine could better protect less institutionalized forms
of input into police, prosecutorial, and judicial decisions as well, like cop
watching (through the First Amendment) and the public’s right to observe
bail hearings, plea colloquies, trials, and sentencings (through the First and
Sixth Amendments). Jocelyn Simonson and others have thoughtfully
shown how this more oppositional approach to participation is an important
source of perspectives that otherwise go unheeded.40
Greater attention to the values (but not the doctrine) of federalism and
its close cousin localism could likewise help. Pushing more criminal justice
power—legislative, enforcement, adjudicative, and penal—down to
directly affected communities and neighborhoods could enhance
representativeness and sharpen lines of authority. City councils could be
given real power to craft their own substantive criminal codes in response
to community concerns—such as stricter gun control laws or more humane
punishments for locally focused crimes—even if far-flung state legislators
disagree. Prosecutorial districts could be drawn more narrowly to minimize
the disconnect between who elects prosecutors (often suburban voters) and
whom they prosecute (often residents of inner-city communities); judicial
districts could be similarly tailored. Prosecutorial and police offices could
adopt genuine community policing and prosecution structures that create
regular and responsive interaction with stakeholders. In reviewing local
laws, policies, and police and prosecutorial actions, judges might consider
the degree to which they reflect community or neighborhood preferences
based on inclusive, responsive, and autonomous processes, deferring more
to those that do.41 Local prosecutors even could be given their own
corrections budgets, which would counteract tunnel vision by widening
their perspective on the impact of their interventions and prompting them to

40

See Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 391, 441–43 (2016); Jocelyn
Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2173, 2197–205,
2227–32 (2014).
41
Cf. Brief for The Chicago Neighborhood Organizations as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner
at 5, City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (No. 97-1121), 1998 WL 328366, at *5 (defending
Chicago’s Gang Congregation Ordinance on the ground that it resulted from the efforts of the inner city,
high-crime neighborhoods in which it was implemented and that those communities should have special
autonomy to adopt norms that are responsive to local conditions).
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work more closely with other actors in the pipeline—police, judges, parole
boards, even community members—to marshal scarce resources.42
Other statutory and administrative reforms could encourage more
circumspect thinking in various ways. Subjecting wholesale police,
prosecutorial, and sentencing policies to some variant of a notice-andcomment process could give more traction to a wider spectrum of
stakeholders and yield more balanced interest representation on those
policies than currently exists. Rewarding parole boards for successful
release decisions or giving them release quotas could prompt them to
consider points of view and interests that they otherwise ignore. Baking
wider consideration of costs into statutory criteria for everything from bail
to sentencing could do something similar, as costs act as a stand-in for
typically ignored viewpoints, forcing decisionmakers to reflect on tradeoffs—the impact of pretrial detention on defendants’ jobs or families, the
community resources consumed by holding them instead of sending them
out with ankle bracelets, and so forth—that they might otherwise shunt
aside.43
These examples are just a start. Some of them would require
substantial innovation in constitutional doctrine or otherwise, and the
political pathologies mentioned earlier would make some difficult to get off
the ground.44 Others would be more straightforward. All would do more to
capture the benefits of fragmentation—the value in matters of criminal
justice that comes from considering the perspectives of diverse
stakeholders—than what we currently have.
CONCLUSION
The Constitution’s rough-and-tumble fragmentation of criminal justice
does not just constrain the state’s power to punish. Ideally, it channels and
guides it, creating pathways for different inputs in an area in which matters
42

Ronald Wright discusses some of these and similar reforms in Ronald F. Wright, Reinventing
American Prosecution Systems, 46 CRIME & JUST. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 21–24, 28–29)
(on file with author).
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See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1276,
1277, 1309, 1314 (2005).
44
Where political obstacles exist, courts and other actors (such as independent commissions)
sometimes can aid in overcoming them by catalyzing and providing political cover for reforms.
California’s Realignment, which substantially localized the responsibility for sentencing large numbers
of low-level offenders, is a good example. Realignment was a direct response to the Supreme Court’s
Brown v. Plata decision ordering California to reduce its state prison population to 137.5% of design
capacity to relieve extreme overcrowding that led to violations of the Eighth Amendment. 563 U.S. 493,
538–45 (2011); see Joan Petersilia, California Prison Downsizing and Its Impact on Local Criminal
Justice Systems, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 327, 327 (2014) (describing the legislative response to
Plata).
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of perspective are of special concern. The daunting challenge is to make
sure that we capture this scheme’s benefits—that the different nodes in the
system give effect to diverse viewpoints representing all stakeholders’
interests. Only by doing so can we realize the “cool and deliberate sense of
the community”45 that the Constitution aims to foster in matters of
punishment.
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